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Increasingly, innovation in artificial intelligence technologies portends the re-
conceptualization of human existentiality along the paradigm of posthumanism. An exposition 
of this through a critical culturo-historical methodology uncloaks the Eurocentric genitive basis 
of the philosophical anthropology that underpins this technological posthumanism, as well as 
its dystopian possibilities.  As a contribution to obviating the latter, an Africanist civilizational 
humanism proclaimed by Pixley ka Isaka Seme is proffered as a plausible alternative paradigm 
for humanity's technological advancement. Seme, a pan-Africanist thinker of the early 
twentieth century, proclaimed humanistic-spirituality as the indispensable gift African 
Civilisation-in-its-renaissance is yet to offer global humanity. His postulation is being provided 
as a contribution to the archive on cross-cultural ethics of artificial intelligence. 
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The so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) is a civilizational epoch. Its development is 
premised on a philosophy of history and a philosophical anthropology which postulate a linear 
and incremental development of the human species beyond its perceived biological constraints 
and cognitive capacities. Facilitated by a technoscientific ideology that nurtures Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and its technologies, this trajectory of human evolution is manifesting itself 
as an active pursuit of programs on research and experimentation on the digitalization of life, 
the enhancement, and augmentations of human biology, as well as the reconfiguration of 
human sociality into a cyber-physical milieu and virtuality. These developments, I will here 
underscore, are driven by some particular rationality and belief on what constitutes “the 
human”, namely, an epistemology and ethical tradition (episteme) that is derived from the 
Euro-American intellectual heritage. The concomitant ideology of globalization, which is a 
vital facet of this culturo-industrial revolution, has ensured the universalization and 
routinization of this technoscientific episteme1 into a hegemonic paradigm in the discourse on 
the ethics of AI (see Fara 2009, pp. 50-91; Lamola 2021). 
 I here set out to draw attention to the ultimate purpose (telos) and consequent crisis 
(kairos)  of AI innovation insofar as the latter is informed by the above-mentioned episteme 
that directs this technoscientific advancement towards the artificialisation of human existence. 
The philosophical anthropology that underpins these transhumanist programs is juxtaposed 
against a specific notion of African humanism, namely, that which is conceived as a feature of 
an assertion of the scientific valence of African Civilisation, as postulated by South African 
nationalist intellectual, Pixley ka Isaka Seme (b.1881-1951). Thereby, I posit a culture-critical 
view of the 4IR that introduces a nuanced appraisal of the Western Philosophy of Artificial 
Intelligence and the application of its consequent biotechnologies. The latter are exposed as 
features of a culturally-informed scientific paradigm that is inaugurating a new phase of a 
global consciousness of “the human”, namely, the routinization of a transhumanist 
consciousness and a technological posthumanist self.   This new paradigm on technologization, 
which I subject to critical scrutiny with an eye on its plausible Africanist alternative, I aim to 
demonstrate, is primarily inspired by a combination of the logic of  “digitized reason” (Peters 
                                                          
1 I employ the term “episteme” to denote the symbiotic and simultaneous relationship between the 
ethical, the epistemological and the cultural; that, an epistemological framework is inherently laced 




and Jandric 2015) and a neo-imperialism of tech-corporatism (Sloan 1996; Zuboff 2019), both 
of which are manifestations of a postmodernism of the Western intellectual heritage (Braidotti 
2013, pp.13-25). As Francesca Ferrando corroborates, “Posthumanism can be considered as a 
second generation of Postmodernism” (2019, 2); it is about the deconstruction of the human. 
Through, and in Seme, therefore, I mount an epistemic specter of a post-Eurocentric 
alternative to this prevailing Euro-American technoaltric dogma on the question of what is the 
most efficacious mode of being civilised/advanced, that is, a technologically-assuaged human. 
Achille Mbembe explicates this “technoaltry” as the cultural acceptance of techniques such as 
genetic engineering and the integration of humans with machines as the basis for the reframing 
of the nature and worth of human biological life, as well as the concomitant socio-genesis of a 
new form of self-consciousness that is even affecting how societal challenges are analyzed 
(Mbembe 2017, pp.21-24). Contra this, a century ago, Seme insisted that humanistic-
spirituality is the essence of African Civilization and proclaimed that the valorization of this 
humanistic-spirituality as the basis of technological advancement is an obligatory contribution 
of Africa to humankind. Implicitly, Seme’s enunciation of the conception of Africa’s 
contribution of unique philosophical anthropology that contradicts the tenets of the propounded 
technological posthumanism of Western Civilisation in its current globalist cloak constitutes 
an evaluative inflection against the triumphalism and routinisation of the latter.  
The pertinent exemplar of the technological posthumanist paradigm I focus on here is 
specifically, the work of the Anglo-American philosopher, Mathew E. Gladden (Gladden 2018; 
2019). Gladden is confidently promoting a version of posthumanism that involves full-scale 
neuro-prostethization of humans to facilitate their seamless connection into a cyber-social 
network with non-human artificial agents. This, according to Gladden, is to be achieved 
through the de-anthropocentrization of conceptions of earthly life. As I explain later on, this 
connection with artificial agents and other non-human animals, he contends, is not only 
progress; it is an axiologically necessary “rehumanization” of the human species (2018, p.56).  
Gladden’s philosophical anthropology is within a spectrum of thought that Nick Bostrom of 
Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute and founder of the World Transhumanist 
Association outlines in his “A History of Transhumanist Thought” (2005). In the latter text, 
Bostrom sketches the genealogy of this “Thought” as a search for human perfectibility and 
optimization of societal performativity, which it is believed, can only be attained through 
technological applications (see also, Parens 1998). Gladdens and Bostrom’s futurism 
constitutes the fulcrum of my engagement of Seme with posthumanism.  
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Following the historicist-projective framework of Bostrom and related researchers 
(Moravec 1999; Kurzweil 1999; Muller 2014), I present the fourth industrial revolution as 
manifesting as an incremental and future-oriented trajectory in the sophistication of innovation 
in digitalization, from elementary AI to advanced Artificial General Intelligence (AGI)  and 
the speculated Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI or Ubiquitous Artificial Intelligence 
Explosion). Following the UNESCO Science Report, Toward 2030, I treat 4IR in its prevalent 
manifestation as ‘Industry 4.0’ as it incipiently advances into Industry 5.0. I view these phases, 
supported by the evolution of information communications technology (ICT) from 4G to 5G,  
as concomitantly instantiating the social ontologies of Society 4.0 and Society 5.0, respectively. 
Specifically, the government of Japan’s Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan (2016) with 
its program towards a cyber-physically integrated super-smart society, Society 5.0, as 
introduced and justified by Gladden (2019, pp.1-39), will be taken as a counterpoint against 
which Seme’s humantologist statement is to be appreciated.  
In the section that follows, I delineate the humantologist crisis AI science2 is turning out to 
portend (Turkle 2014). By humantology, I mean a profoundly in-depth systematic inquiry and 
theorisation around the question of that which is the quintessential feature or dimension of 
being human, that which sets a person and human society apart from other life-forms. In my 
view, a humantologist inquiry is exemplified by the kind of reflection Martin Heidegger 
undertook in his Letter on Humanism (1947). I opt for this terminology in order to distinguish 
the domain of my disquisition as being a step deeper than performative commitments such as 
“humanism” and “humanitarianism”.  Since the question of the modality of human being that 
is being constructed by current revolution in technology is the crux of our disquisition, this 
point is addressed in the subsequent section that introduces the notion of humantology as a 
functional category that has justified my specific choice of Seme as the interlocutor against 
technological posthumanism. These two sections are followed by straightforward explications 
of the predicted rollout of the sophistication of computing technology into Artificial Super 
Intelligence, which should lead to the predicted human-machine Singularity with its networked 
cyber-physical sociality (Society 5.0, Society 6.0). I conclude with a reflection on the 
philosophical import of Seme’s articulations as garnered from his 1906 Speech “The 
Regeneration of Africa” against the backdrop of the exposed telos of a Western philosophy of 
technology. 
                                                          
2 Artificial intelligence (AI) is here understood as a new paradigm and practice in technical science 
dating from the late 1950s that studies and develops theory, methods and application systems used to 




2. The quest for alternative frames of technology and humanity 
Heralding what now represents the horizon of thought and research on artificial intelligence 
technologies' anthropic ethics3, the final chapter of Yuval Noah Hariri’s widely-read Sapiens, 
A Brief History of Humankind is titled, “The End of Homo Sapiens” (Hariri 2011, pp.445-464). 
In addition to his predictions on the ramifications of the emerging vistas of experimentation in 
the biomedical sciences on biological re-engineering of the human body, he concludes 
explicitly that the definite driver toward this portended end of humankind lies in the yet-to-be-
explored immense potential of AI. Referring to the possibilities of a bionic life of human brains 
that could be integrated with computerized devices, he alerts that “we stand poised into 
becoming true cyborgs, of having inorganic features that are inseparable from our bodies, 
features that modify our abilities, desires, personalities, and identities” (2011, p.453). 
Corroborating Hariri’s fears, Klaus Schwab (2016; 2018, 156-192), founder of the World 
Economic Forum and a leading proponent of  “the Fourth Industrial Revolution” confirms that, 
[the] Fourth Industrial Revolution . . . is characterized by a fusion of 
technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and 
biological spheres . . .  finally, [it] will change not only what we do but also who 
we are. It will affect our identity and all the issues associated with it . . . sooner 
than we think, it may lead to human augmentation (Schwab 2015)   
The foregoing statements broach the discourse on the essence of human ontology and the 
possibilities of being beyond the human (onto-existentiality4). In this context, the distinction 
between transhumanism and specifically, “posthumanism”, has stood out as the most intriguing 
question to be foregrounded by this unprecedented intrusion of technology into human life. 
The manner in which internet technologies with embedded AI have virtualized and augmented 
human reality has crystallized the fact that the difference between the two concepts consists 
primarily in the degree of the continuum in human technologisation (See Wolfe 2010, pp. xi-
xxv).  
                                                          
3 See for e.g., Future of Life Institute. An open letter - research priorities for robust and beneficial 
artificial intelligence, January 2015. URL https,//futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter/ 
4 Existence, as a function of subjectivity, is ascribed exclusively to humans as the sum of self-
consciousness. Other possible forms of existence, say as a cyborg, is granted as onto-existential. 
6 
 
Joel Garreau’s enlightening explication that “the transhuman is a description of those 
who are in the process of becoming posthuman” is helpful (in Wolfe 2010, xiii). 
Transhumanism is about the process of which the purpose, the telos, is the posthuman. In our 
increasingly technology-mediated lived-life, ontologically, we are the transhuman on the cusp 
of a transhumanist techno-culture that is incipiently changing us into the posthuman (see Floridi 
2015; Tegmark 2017; Royakkers et al. 2018). The posthuman is our future; transhumanism is 
thus both a transitory ontological stage, and a teleological belief system5 that sustains the march 
towards the idealized state of being human, the posthuman. In this sense of “posthumanism” 
as a technophilic intellectual-ideological commitment, I deal with posthumanism here and not 
as a theoretical heuristic of the kind Rosi Braidotti (2013) grapples with in her The Posthuman. 
In our working understanding, technology is at the core of the reconfiguration of the meaning 
of human being; we are experiencing and undergoing a technogenesis (Hayles 2013, 28; 
Frischmann and Selinger 2018). Noteworthy for the motif of this paper is that the nadir point 
of this anthropologic technoscientific movement, its eschaton6, is the machining of humanity, 
the dream of so-called Singularity - the fusion of machine and human consciousness (Vinge 
1993; Bostrom 2014), which is the future of AI. In civilizational terms, this would be the 
attainment of a “Human-Machine Civilization”. 
In Damaged Life, The Crisis of the Modern Psyche, Tod Sloan (1996), a psychologist, 
concludes in this study of the socio-psychological consequences of Western Modernity that 
humanity under the post-World War II  hegemonic capitalist culture resembles a collective 
dysfunctional persona that seeks to be redeemed from its postmodernist existentiality which 
for him, is not only psychopathological but dystopian as well7.  The leitmotif of this work is a 
reasoned call that “workable visions of non-consumerist and non-individualistic utopias are 
desperately needed” (Sloan 1996, p.132). Taking into consideration the interconnections 
established between Modernity and technology in Western thought, especially since Jean-
                                                          
5  Julian Huxley, a distinguished biologist  credited with coining the term “transhumanism” wrote in 
Religion Without Revelation (1927), “The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just 
sporadically, an individual here in one way, an individual there in another way – but in its entirety, as 
humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve, man remaining 
man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.” (quoted in  
Bostrom 2005, 7, own emphasis) 
6 That is, “the fulfilled Promise”, given our working understanding of posthumanism as being a belief 
system, a philosophical rationalisation directed to the service of the technologized humans, and a 
multi-species de-anthropocentric “society”. 




Francois Lyotard’s elaboration of The Postmodern Condition (1984; and Lyotard 1991) as the 
locus of technology and posthumanism, I venture to posit here that an Africanist philosophical 
anthropology that is articulated in cognisance of technological advancement serves as the 
alternative framework that Sloan covets. The elements of this African alternative are uniquely 
discernible in some of the writings of Seme, who seminally problematized the notion of 
“civilization” as a process that is monochronically conceived in Western terms. 
In 1906, the twenty-five-year-old Seme from Zululand earned a Columbia University’s 
highest oratorical honour8, the George William Curtis medal in gold for a speech that has 
become monumental in the annals of African social philosophy (Ndlovu 2014; Ngqulunga 
2017, pp.26-31). The title of the speech was “The Regeneration of Africa” (Seme [1906], in 
Karis and Carter 1972, pp. 69-73). Asserting that “the African is not a proletarian in the world 
of science and art” as the twentieth-century was emerging into the exuberance of the second 
industrial revolution (electricity, telephone etc), from New York City, he courageously 
declared that “the regeneration of Africa means that a new and unique civilization is soon to 
be added to the world.” In the same breath, he proceeded to canonize that “the most essential 
departure of this new civilization is that it shall be thoroughly spiritual and humanistic – indeed 
a regeneration moral and eternal” (p. 71).  
The speech’s main theme, that Africa “the giant is awakening” (p.73) from the shackles 
of colonialisation, and that in her rising a new conception of sociality was about to be added to 
what he perceived to be world civilizations, was destined to establish it as one of the earliest 
canonical pieces of postcolonial African thought.  Nearly six decades later, on 12 December 
1962, the President of the first freed African country, Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, was inspired 
to read Seme’s speech in full as he opened the First International Congress of Africanists, an 
event which, according to Michael Crowder  “became in effect an important declaration of 
cultural independence by Africa” (Crowder 1963, 251). In South Africa, Seme’s philosophy 
and labors were to bestow him the title of “The Man Who Founded the ANC” in 1912 
(Ngqulunga 2017). In addition, they were to inspire the self-affirmation of later generations of 
Blacks against the vulgarisation the African episteme had suffered under Dutch-British 
colonialism and Apartheid.  Alluding to the same predilection of a humanistic appropriation of 
technology by Africans as iconically articulated by Seme, Steve Biko would write in 1971,  





Westerners seem to be ever concerned with perfecting their technological know-
how while losing out on their spiritual dimension. We believe that in the long 
run, the special contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of human 
relationships. The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving 
the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has to come from 
Africa – giving the world a more human face. (Biko 2004[1971], p.51) 
Seme’s articulation of the renaissance of Africa around 1906 and 1912  in terms that utilizes 
the conceptual frame of the humanitas latent in “civilizations”, and his obsession with 
“progress and national success” were patently novel then9,  but retain their valence in 
contemporary considerations of the effects of technology on human consciousness. As we shall 
observe towards our conclusion, Seme’s frame of thought allows us to think beyond the context 
of the prevailing theories of African humanism and communitarianism, such as the vexed prism 
of Ubuntu (see Matalino 2015). His education and life at Columbia University and Oxford 
University between 1902 and 1910 enmeshed him into a peculiar intellectual climate of the rise 
of Pan-African consciousness (see Geiss 1974). He interacted and corresponded with iconic 
founders of Africa’s political and cultural renaissance.  His latest10 biographer, Bongani 
Ngqulunga (2017) attest to how his protagonist, The Man who founded the ANC and the 
newspaper Abantu-Batho in 1912 enjoyed the social circle that included Alain LeRoy Locke, 
Booker T. Washington, and W.E.B Du Bois during his university years (Ngqulunga 2017, p.37-
43, 242). This exposure inculcated into Seme a political consciousness that was grounded on a 
faith in Africa’s intellectual prowess in areas ranging from law, science to economic 
entrepreneurship11, all of which he indefatigably sought to demonstrate in his practice as a 
human rights attorney and African nationalist (see Ndlovu 2014).   
Before I elaborate further on the pertinent features of the technologically-aware African 
humanism proclaimed by Seme, I need to explicate the philosophical essence of the discursive 
terrain of humantology. Also, we need to take stock of the trajectory of the scientific 
advancement that AI is taking. These will enable us to better appreciate the contrast of Seme’s 
philosophical anthropology and its contemporary significance. 
                                                          
9 See Seme “Native Union” article in Imvo Zabantsundu, October 24, 1911 (in Karis & Carter 1972, 
p.72) 
10 Other biographical writings on Seme are,  (Rive and Couzens 1993); (Mashamaite 2011);  (Karis 
and Carter 1977) 
11 For a record Seme’s formation of the Native Farmers’ Association in 1912 with its land buying 
programme, and his vision of black economic upliftment during his Presidency of the ANC  in the 




3. Toward an Africanist  studium humanitatis 
 In the “Letter on Humanism” Martin Heidegger (1985 [1947], pp.274-308) delineated a 
discourse on what he called studium humanitatis12. This would be a constructivist reflection on 
the status of humankind in relation to human person’s awareness (understanding/culture 
/paideia) of being in a world that is shared with other life-forms. This passionate grappling 
with studium humanitas, rather than the content of the postulations of Heidegger’s 
anthropological philosophy is what is of relevance for us. From his reflection, we garner a 
series of categories that would illuminate the significance of Seme’s intervention. In the Letter, 
Heidegger inter alia explicated how the human genus, which zoologically is an animalitas, 
graduates into the humanis. This, he suggests, is achieved as homo animalitas acquires 
humanity, the humanitas which is a peculiar dimension that defines its status as homo humanus.  
The attainment of this humanitas, which is the instant of ‘standing out’, ek-sistence, is self-
consciousness. Human consciousness is human being, which is a given (da-sein). This self-
awareness is what establishes the human being away from a mere homo animalis (‘biological 
life’) (Heidegger 1985, p.300; see Rae 2014, pp.56-57). This self-consciousness, with its 
simultaneous awareness of the humanitas of others, being-with-others-in-the-world (Mitsein), 
is what defines humanity, according to him (Heidegger 1962 [1927], pp.150-157).  He would 
further add logos as speech/reason as what makes Mitsein possible, and therefore a feature that 
distinguishes humans from animals13. 
Derived from this classification, the cardinal humantological question relevant to the 
subject of this paper is: What is the quintessential feature of this animal, a zoological homo 
animalus that is aware of itself, and is thus a homo sapiens (a sapient being) with a self-
constitutive proclivity to exist as a social-relational homo-politicus with material needs that 
renders it a homo economicus (Aristotle) who requires tools and skills (technology) to survive?  
Does the notion of “being human”  that is currently being propounded or promised by the 
episteme that is informing developments in digital technologies cohere with, or preserve, the 
humanitus of homo humanus? If not, are there alternatives elsewhere in the global arena of 
human civilizations which achieve this humantological ideal? Specifically, besides the well-
                                                          
12 It is instructive that Heidegger wrote this essay, purportedly in response to Jean-Paul Sartre’s  
“Existentialism is Humanism” (1945), two years after the vanquishing of Nazi Germany, with whose 
ideology he had sympathised. By this time, the newly established United Nations with its Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights had seized the discourse on the uniqueness of human dignity and life. 
13 For a posthumanistic variation to this, see Olivier (2018). 
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trodden exposition of African communitarian philosophies such as Ubuntu/Botho (Ramose 
1999; Mhlambi 2020), does African Civilisation and its epistemologies have anything to 
contribute to the debate on the technoscientific crisis of the humanitas of Homo sapiens? 
I consider Seme’s epochal 1906 speech, including the reference to Biko, made above, 
as nuggets of an Africanist studium humanitatis. They establish that the question AI technology 
is posing on us, is not about “how to be regarded as a human being”, that is, humanness and 
human rights (regard for, and behaving like a human). It is more about the complexity of 
retrieving and preserving the essential conception of a holistically self-conscious and 
autonomous person against the one being delivered by the philosophical anthropology of a 
postmodernist technology-assuaging Westernism. Is what defines a human being her 
introjected self-transcendence with a sense of responsibility to self and the world around her, 
as alluded to by Seme and Biko, or is it her openness to be psychically and biologically self-
extended beyond the limits of her physical, intellectual and creative abilities, conjoining herself 
with androids, animaloids, and other artificial agents, as will be suggested by Gladden?  What 
is the standard to be set on what should be considered to be a human being in the 
technologically-advanced future?  
 
4. The future of AI and human ontology. 
Technoscientists are yet to map the exact path of the future of human life as AI is increasingly 
impacting it. In the words Klaus Schwab, an industry spokesperson whose position reveals the 
influential role of commercial interests in driving research in this field, “We do not yet know 
just how it will unfold [but] when compared with previous industrial revolutions, the Fourth is 
evolving at an exponential rather than a linear pace.” (2015). However, since Vernor Vinge’s 
NASA paper, “The coming technological Singularity, how to survive in the posthuman era” 
(1993), a consensus is that the nadir point of the revolution in artificial intelligence will be 
marked by a convergence of capabilities drawn from Machine Learning and neuroscience into 
a fusion of the operative power of the computer with that of the human brain, a Singularity 
(Clark and Chalmers1998; Russel and Novig 2014, pp.13-15). 
Within the strict bounds of the domain of Computer Science, what has already so 
dramatically impacted our lives is only an elementary phase of AI, which is not yet at par with 
the human mind's cognitive intricacies. This is Artificial Narrow Intelligence or ANI. The next 
frontier in research and innovation is that of Artificial General Intelligence or AGI (Bostrom 
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2014). According to Max Tegmark, this AGI will be “human-level artificial general 
intelligence” (Tegmark 2017, p.31). Computers, in their nanotechnological forms, will be able 
to think with, and like humans; they will compete with, or augment human cognitive 
capabilities.  In the current ANI stage, the self-direction of machine learning is still in its 
embryonic stages, computers and robots still need to be programmed with a thought-
architecture that is based on that of the human mind; hence current AI is referred to as “weak 
intelligence” (IEEE 2017, p.73). This weak intelligence has nevertheless inaugurated and 
sustained the Fourth Industrial Revolution's socio-economic phenomenon, Industry 4.0. 
Remarkably, this Industry 4.0, fuelled from technological platforms such as 4G-enabled 
smartphones, has managed to transform the terms of human relationality in profound ways, 
ushering what in sociological terms can rightly be called a Society 4.0 (Webster 1995). The 
envisaged AGI is expected to trigger much more radical transformations of our human life 
experience and our understanding thereof. Conveyed through 5G platforms, it will catapult us 
into Society 5.0 and beyond (Gladden 2018; Naude and Dimitri 2020).  
This transition of Industry 4.0 into Industry 5.0, mutatis mutandis from Society 4.0 into 
Society 5.0, is the Holy Grail that defines the onset of a posthuman era. This posthumanism 
will be marked by the incorporation of non-human inanimate objects into a redefined notion of 
embodiment and the constitution of the fabric of society.  Ultimately, the de-centering of “the 
human” (both as the anthropos and humanus), as the vantage point of the meaning of earthly 
conscious life will be consummated. This de-anthropocentrization of life, in Gladden’s words, 
can be characterized thus, 
Society 5.0 will differ from Society 4.0 largely by welcoming into itself a 
bewildering array of highly sophisticated social and emotional robots, embodied 
AI, nanorobotic swarms, artificial life, self-organizing and self-directing 
computer networks, artificial agents manifesting themselves within virtual 
worlds, and other artificial types of intelligent cyber-physical social actors. 
(2019, p.39).  
Concurrently, for his thesis on the theory of the evolution of the modes of human life, in his 
Life 3.0, being human in an age of Artificial Intelligence, Tegmark (2017), a physicist and 
cosmologist, classes the emergence of Society 5.0 as the third stage of life due to its posthuman 
techno-centrism. This arises from his postulation of an incremental series of cosmic cognitive-
evolutionary stages of human development, from the simple biological evolution stage (Life 
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1.0) to cultural evolution (Life 2.0) and the ultimate technological evolution (Life 3.0) 
(Tegmark 2017, pp.25-27). Tegmark’s typology is helpful as within his Life 3.0 paradigm, the 
succeeding G6 development can be accommodated (see Zhao et. al 2021). 
The total effect of Industry 5.0, within the Life 3.0 and Society 5.0 timeframe, is 
envisaged to be attained through the ever-accelerating innovations in technological 
breakthroughs in the Internet of Things (IoT) and Internet of Bodies (IoB) (Sen et al, 2020) 
with their bionic wearable or implantable AI, augmented and virtual reality, social robotics, or 
simply by the predicted explosion of Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI). ASI denotes the 
occurrence of a developmental moment when various AI-powered devices and machines will 
autonomously interact with each other, replicating their computing power exponentially ad 
infinitum, creating datasets that do not require human initiation and control (Tegmark 2017, 
pp.134-160).   
While the nature of the actual occurrence of is ASI remains the subject of research 
among data scientists, it is generally accepted that it is the zenith point of AGI (Bostrom 1998).  
Bostrom (2015) has been bold enough to claim that this stage is achievable within “the first 
half of this [twenty-first] century” (p. 8). Futurist, Ray Kurzweil, who until recently was the 
Director of Engineering at Google [Alphabet], is more specific, the explosion of Artificial 
Super Intelligence will take place in 2045 (Kurzweil 1999). This prompted a 2011 issue of 
Time Magazine to bear the cover page “2045 The Year Man Becomes Immortal”14.   
By way of an illustration of how the move from ANI to AGI would relate to changes in 
human behavior and way of  life, Andrew Kirby, CEO of one of Toyota’s regional business centers, 
recently outlined five grade-levels of sophistication in automation that will have to be tackled in the 
march towards fully-fletched driverless automobiles that possess fully synchronous vehicle-to-
vehicle communication capabilities. He described the first three of these as “involving only systems 
such as smart braking and lane-keeping assistance”15.  This is ANI. The realization of fully 
autonomous vehicles represents the transitional phase from level-four to level-five sophistication, 
which requires ubiquitous 5G and 6G bandwidth access. What Kirby did not elaborate on, which in 
my view would be expressive of the advanced stage of Industry 5.0 as AGI, will not only be the 
                                                          
14 Time Magazine, February 21, 2011,  
http,//content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20110221,00.html  Accessed 20 November 2019 





integration of the owner’s calendar with the memory of the car but could involve a capability 
whereby the autonomous vehicle (no longer called “a car”) will automatically execute routine chores 
for the owner, with the latter’s neural impulses electronically transmitted directly to the vehicle’s 
computer/memory16. This will be the human mind and the machine fused into a symbiotic ontology, 
a Singularity (Bostrom 2005, pp.7-8)17. In Vinge’s (1993) words, given the essentially independent 
capabilities of the machine-side of this symbiosis, this would mean that “the human era will be 
ended” (1993, p.11). The human being who has been the premier controller and monitor of 
machine’s functionality, will be demoted to an equal interlocutor with the machine. 
The necessary technological challenge towards this human-machine singularity will, of 
course, be the development of viable neural links between machines and the human brain, wherein 
humans will have to submit to neuroprosthetic intelligence. Billionaire physicist and CEO of 
Neuralink, Elon Musk (Vance 2015), has emerged as the iconic champion of this future hybrid 
species. He recently counseled,  
 If we can effectively merge with AI by improving the neural link between the cortex 
and your digital extension of yourself — which already exists, it just has a bandwidth 
issue — then effectively you become an AI human symbiote. And if that then is 
widespread, anyone who wants it can have it, then we solve the control problem as 
well. We don’t have to worry about some evil dictator AI because we are the AI 
collectively.’18 
 
                                                          
16 Incidentally, during October 2019 Toyota unveiled an on-board vehicle control system which is 
designed to perform on a bond developed between the AI suite and the emotions and biological state 
of the driver. Named “Yui”, this AI suite delivers a personalised experience based on its monitoring 
of a driver's emotional state and alertness. The AI can engage with the driver using interactive voice 
communication, in-seat functions designed to increase alertness or reduce stress, fragrances and other 
human-machine interactions. https,//www.businesslive.co.za/bd/life/motoring/2019-10-17-meet-
toyotas-onboard-buddy/ Accessed 17 October 2019 
17 See,  http,//content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2048299,00.html Accessed 20 October 
2019 
18 Quoted in Michael Woronko “Exploring the philosophical implications of our imminent clash with 





In Musk’s mind, the convergence of machine learning and neuroscience is at hand. The endpoint of 
pure human consciousness is within reach, and even the ethical issues about being neurologically 
controlled by machines are systematically pre-empted through a posthumanist logic. 
5. Being human in Society 5.0 
 In an informative and provocative paper “Who will be the members of Society 5.0? Towards 
an anthropology of technologically posthumanised future societies” Gladden (2019) engages 
in what turns out to be a philosophical rationalization of the Government of Japan’s 2016 Fifth 
Science and Technology Basic Plan. The latter details a commitment to accelerating the 
transformation of Japanese society “into Society 5.0”19.  Differentiated from current 
philosophical studies that deal with the historical proliferation of experimentation in robotics 
in Japanese society, such as Jennifer Robertson’s (2017) Robo Sapiens Japanicus, Gladden’s 
paper marks the discursive terrain of the axiological-ontological challenges latent in Industry 
5.0, the re-ontologization of human sociality into a global trope of Society 5.0.  
Enthused by Japan’s vision of developing into a form of society that will involve 
“merging the physical space (real world) and cyberspace by leveraging ICT to its fullest” 
(Government of Japan 2016, p.13), Gladden mounts two polemical frameworks that advocate 
this initiative as a positive step for humankind. These he details as, 
(1) a posthumanist anthropological model of human history in which Society 
5.0 represents an emerging stage of the world’s ‘technological re-
posthumanization’; and (2) a phenomenological anthropological analysis of 
Society 5.0 as a combination of particular types of ‘natural’ biological human 
beings, artificially augmented human beings, and metahuman, epihuman, 
parahuman, and non-human beings. (Gladden 2019, p.7) 
Thus inspired, he proceeds to contemplate an Ultimate Cyber-Physical Society in which, 
typologically, human beings are functionally integrated into a cyber-physical system at the 
cognitive, social, and physical levels. This “Society 5.0” is consequently theorized into a cogent 
sociological construct of meta-society that becomes a “cyber-physical-social system” (Gladden 
2019,p. 4). What emerges at the core of this novel social theory, is a view that de-centres the 
human being as the defining factor of what constitutes a society, hence my inference of a “meta-
                                                          
19 See https,//www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/basic/5thbasicplan.pdf 
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society”. This cyber-physical space with its myriad conglomeration of organic and inorganic, 
as well as hybrid and theriomorphic inhabitants, is cast at the typology of a de-
anthropocentrized  society. 
This human-machine clustered, quasi-artificial sociality, whose characterization by 
Gladden I quoted earlier, is, according to him, not only a posthuman society; it is a 
posthumanized society. He points out that “posthumanist scholarship seeks to ‘de-
anthropocentrize’ our study of societies by arguing, for example, that society not only includes 
its human members but also non-human members such as our house pets or mythical or 
legendary figures whose existence we half-believe in.”  (Gladden 2019, p.7). He then argues 
that primordially, since during its Society 1.0 evolutionary state humankind freely shared its 
world with non-humans (animals), we were originally “posthuman”.  The technialtry of Society 
5.0 with its cyborg human actors and autonomous socially intelligent artificial agents is, thus, 
welcomed not only as the de-athropocentrization of the social space but as the “re-
posthumanization” of humankind. According to Gladden, the posthuman is the ideal state of 
being human, and human being needs to be re-posthumanized ((Gladden 2019, p.8). The 
deepening drive into the socio-technicity of the postmodern human is, in fact, a liberating 
recovery of what human being has innately been. Perversely, this technological posthumanism 
“re-humanizes” the human, according to his claim. 
What Gladden’s work provokes is how contemporary society in the fourth industrial 
revolution can be unwittingly be posthumanized. A transhuman psyche is being engendered by 
the persuasively pervasive human-computer culture we are intractably embedded into.  We 
already are a de-anthropocentrizing world with an ever-emergent cyber-physical social space. 
Through capitalistic commercial persuasion, we progressively live through AI devices, bots, 
and robots. This is our humantological kairos, a moment of reckoning with the true state of our 
humanitas. Is it necessary to preserve of our status as homo humanus (distinct from homo 
animalitas)?   
In 1998 Clark and Chalmers had in their famous paper “The Extended Mind” described 
how the modern human mind is virtually interwoven with the functionality of computers. They 
suggested that this ubiquitous interlocution with machines is a shared and integrated human-
computer “mentalese” (1998, p.7). During Industry 4.0, we have progressively been ensnared 
and lulled into technological somnambulism of a hybrid consciousness in which we exist 
intractably as being-online and being-offline as evocatively protested by contributors to The 
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Onlife Manifesto, being human in a hyper-connected era (Floridi 2015). This hybrid 
subjectivity ranges from us not minding being bullied (nudged) by the electronic beeper in our 
cars to put on a seatbelt (Spahn 2012), to happily allowing the State to garner digital records 
of our movement by tracking our mobile phones in the name of saving us from a pandemic.  
           But as far as Bostrom, Musk, Gladden, and the Japanese Government are concerned, we 
are yet to be practically integrated into the cyber realm, into the idealized virtually integrated 
and seamless cyber-physical bio-prosthetic social network.  We will soon require 
neuroprosthetic brains and other forms of technological augmentation which will consummate 
our full connectivity with the ever-evolving AI cybersphere. In this emerging world, an 
“enlightened” digitized rationality is that which does not frown upon cyborgs and humanoid 
robots, embracing these as necessary and desirable members of the de-anthropocentrized re-
posthumanized life-space. Gladden is preparing us for the eventuality of great-grandchildren 
who will be either metahumans, epihumans, parahumans, or non-human humans. This is the 
philosophical anthropology of his technological posthumanism. 
6. The African humanist prism  
 
With the scope of ethical vigilance on the impact of AI technologies already proscribed by the 
academic contours of the Euro-American philosophical tradition, and with research on AI being 
fostered by formidable corporate interests, the only remaining possible question is: What would be 
the response of corporate leaders of the global technology companies such as Neuralink20 and 
philosophers of technology such as Gladden and Bostrom to a humanistic paradigm as that 
articulated by Seme? 
The key tenet of Seme’s humanism stood out to be an emphasis that “the new order of 
things”, the self-regenerating Africa, meant that a new and unique civilization was being added 
to the world, and that “the most essential departure of this new civilization is that it shall be 
thoroughly spiritual and humanistic – indeed a regeneration moral and eternal” (ibid), as we 
noted earlier. He elucidated this vision of a recuperated Africa as an epochal inauguration of a 
new perspective into the global community of techno-cultures that arises as an express 
contribution of a worldview that venerates the sanctity and preservation of the human life-form 
- a philanthropia (love and compassion for humanity). This re-centers the human. The 
                                                          




surrender of human agency to machines is here not fathomed. His was a novel conception of 
the possibility of the symbiosis of scientific progress with human spirituality. With a poetic 
spirit, he lauded this for a future Africa thus: 
I seem to see her chains dissolved . . . her Abyssinia and her Zululand the seats 
of science and religion, reflecting the glory of the rising sun from the spires of 
their churches and universities . . . her crowded cities sending forth the hum of 
business, and all her sons employed in advancing the victories of peace – greater 
more abiding than the spoils of war. (Seme 1972 [1906], p.71) 
 
The historical force and salience of Seme’s philosophy, this utopia of a spiritualist humanism, 
lay in the paradox of it being proclaimed under the cold shadow of the systemic dehumanization 
of Colonial Modernity. As referenced earlier, Biko re-appropriated and cast this humanism into 
a counter-vision against the dystopia of Apartheid and Western Modernity globally in his 
declaration that “in the long run the special contribution to the world by Africa will be in this 
field of human relationship. The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving 
the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has to come from Africa – 
giving the world a more human face (Biko 2004[1971], p.51). 
Tandem to the spirit of Seme’s thought, before Biko, Frantz Fanon in the very last 
paragraphs of The Wretched of the Earth, ominously echoes the same imperative for the 
installation of an alternative “scientific” dispensation that Seme aspired for and whose 
humanist goal would be elaborated by Biko. Asserting an Africanist studium humanitas Fanon 
lyrically exhorted: 
That same Europe where they were never done talking of Man [humanity], and 
where they never stopped proclaiming that they were only anxious for the 
welfare of Man, today we know with what sufferings humanity has paid for 
every one of their triumphs of the mind . . . . Come, then, comrades, the 
European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today 
can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not 
obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe . . . Humanity is waiting for 
something from us other than such an imitation, which would be almost an 
obscene caricature . . . Let us try to create the whole man (sic), whom Europe 




Seme invocation of the “spiritual”, adumbrated the soul – a seat of consciousness of 
transcendence, religion - as the essence of human uniqueness. Fanon and Biko’s later political 
struggle against colonial de-humanisation identified the imputation of a “human face” onto a 
racialized world as a characteristic that is an ontological imperative for all of human life. This 
“quest for true humanity” (Biko 2004 [1973]) is a counter-narrative against Bostrom’s 
cyborgical posthumanization, and Ferrando’s de-anthropocentric antihumanism (Ferrando 
2019, p.67). Equally, this Africanist “utopia” is a re-inscription of the humanis into Homo 
sapiens, distinguishing the human species from the homo animalus that Gladden insists must 
be incorporated into a de-anthropocentrized cyber-society.  
Readers of Gladden and Ferrando will, however, find it fascinating, if not puzzling that 
in the article “Native Union” written in 1911 as a critique of tribalism, Seme averred that, “the 
greatest success shall come when man (sic) have learned to co-operate, not only with his kith 
and kin but with all peoples and with all life” (in Karis & Carter 1972, p.72, emphasis mine). 
Whilst re-centering the human, the Africanist humanism of Seme’s thought, was thus not 
premised on an unbridled exploitation of other forms of life. 
Significantly, Seme’s view on the status of being human -  or humantological reflection 
- cut directly into the core issue of technology as the marker of human advancement, and culture 
as manifesting as a Civilization. Having studied in the United States since his teens and living 
in New York City during a time in history that is best described as the birth of the twentieth 
century, afforded Seme first-hand experience of Modernity in its glorious rise. He lived through 
the excitement of Second Industrial Revolution: electricity, commercialization of the internal 
combustion engine spawning the possibility of public transport and organized industrial mass 
production.  In his own words, he uniquely revelled in this “new and powerful period” (in Karis 
& Carter 1972, 71) with an eye of a critical observer, interpreting these tantalizing 
advancements against a vision of a downtrodden Africa. This vantage point imbued him with 
the courage to tamper the triumphalism and cultural self-assuredness of this pre-First World 
War Euro-American civilization, teaching that “civilization resembles an organic being in its 
development – it is born, it perishes, and it can propagate itself.” (Seme 1972 [1906], p.71). 
Debunking the demeaning view held on the state of Africa’s progress, following the 
opening statement of his speech that “I am an African, and I set my pride in my race over 
against a hostile public opinion” he dwelt on making a point that the grade or advancement of 
human civilizations must not be compared, as a “common standard is not impossible!” (ibid. 
69). He subverted the self-arrogation by the West of being the pinnacle of progress and the 
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paragon of the ideal cultural-modality of Humanity based on its strides in its technological 
advances. 
 Against a historiography that has submerged and delinked Africa from its pre-colonial 
technological successes and scientific achievements, he orated, “Come with me to the ancient 
capital of Egypt, Thebes . . . the pyramids of  Egypt are structures to which the world presents 
nothing comparable . . . All the glory of Egypt belongs to Africa and her people” (ibid, 69).  
Despite the ambiguous and liminal status of the Africa of his experience, he upheld a vision of 
a technologically developed Africa. He foretold that an Africa struggling out of the horror of 
enslavement and suffocating under colonization “has refused to camp forever on the borders 
of the industrialized world; having learned that education is power, he [sic] is educating his 
children” (ibid, 71).  Education, he maintained, “must be regarded as positive evidence of the 
process of [Africa’s] regeneration” (ibid.). Kgosi Khama of the then so-named Bechuanaland 
(Botswana) is lauded as the exemplary “preacher of industry and education, and an apostle of 
the new order of things” (ibid). 
Ultimately, Seme de-absolutized the Hegelian rendition of the emergence of scientific 
excellence and world history as being a thread peculiarly sprouting from the navel of the 
Mediterranean Sea. His work reminds us that prevalent civilizationalist categories that describe 
human progress in terms of the linearity of the premodern, modern, and postmodern are merely 
constructs of Western historiography. In their autochthonous German Idealism, these are 
Zeitgeistes within the Volksgeistes of the European world and culture. There could be other 
alternatives to this assumption of the chronology of human progress.  With Seme, we can now 
ask why must the trajectory of human civilization as marked by sophistication in the innovation 
and appropriation of technology veer only through the posthumanising gestalt of “Industry 1.0 
to Industry 6.0” and the corresponding “Society 1.0 to Society 6.0” as informed by the 
presupposition of a Western outlook on the evolution of life. An authentic global culture should 
surely be a fusion of contributions from all “Civilisations”, in which Western agonisations 




I have here posited an historico-futuristic portrait of advancements in artificial intelligence 
technologies insofar as these are geared at inaugurating a new understanding of human sociality 
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and the meaning of being human. I have drawn attention to critical reviews such as that of 
Sloan (1996) that indicate that a culturo-intellectual tradition that is buttressing this, namely, 
Western Philosophy of anthropology in its particular postmodern stage, requires a critical 
alternative. My elaboration of the postulates around transhumanism and posthumanism as 
constructs generated in the service of the Fourth Industrial Revolution's technical program has 
shone the light on the direction this philosophical anthropology is headed, namely an ever-
widening de-anthropic turn. This de-centering of the human in both her sociality and biological 
being as a feature of a technological age, I have argued, raises deeply fundamental questions 
about the constitution of the human, a humantological inquiry. I then ventured to suggest that 
a view of technological progress as a civilization, a culturo-historical phenomenon, as 
uncloaked by Seme, and the centralization of a humanistic ethical-spiritualist conception of 
technological progress emblematic of the philosophy of the “reawakening” Africa, constitutes 
a credible contribution to the debate and search for the ideal state of being human in the rapidly 
evolving technological age.  
 
  Seme challenges us to generate an African philosophy of technology that should be a 
contributor in the discourses around the nature and ramifications of the advances in Artificial 
Intelligence. I maintain that the very statement of the possibility of an alternative African 
humanist vision, such as this article’s introduction of Pixley ka Isaka Seme, is significant 
enough to set it as a normative deterrent against other forms of a crass dilution, or sub-
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